Navigating the Problem of Evil: A Critique of Louise Antony’s Argument

Contextualizing Antony’s Argument

In this essay, I will argue that Louise Antony’s argument against the probable existence of God fails because it unreasonably assumes our moral knowledge is sufficient to declare divine allowances of suffering unjustified. Antony argues the amount and distribution of suffering makes it unlikely an omnipotent and morally good God exists, since there is probably no adequate reason for such a being to permit this amount of suffering. Although Antony provides a well-reasoned argument, her objection relies on an unsupported assumption about our moral limits.

Analyzing Antony’s Conception of God

Now that I have provided some context to this paper, I will explain how Antony’s argument works and analyze its validity and soundness. Before that, it is important to understand how Antony describes God. Though she does not provide an explicit definition, Antony appears to be working with a traditional Judeo-Christian conception of God based on the attributes and responsibilities she ascribes to this being. Specifically, Antony states God is “omnipotent,” meaning all-powerful with unlimited power. She also describes God as “morally good” and “omnibenevolent,” depicting an inherently ethical, benevolent being.

Antony’s writing suggests that she views God as a personal entity rather than an impersonal force. This is evident in her discussions about God’s motivations and reasoning abilities. She refers to God as “a being” with power and perfect morals, which aligns with the western monotheistic concept of God. Antony also suggests that God has the ability to prevent suffering but chooses not to, indicating that God actively engages in earthly matters rather than remaining detached. Overall, Antony’s portrayal of God corresponds with the widely accepted philosophical understanding of the nature and capabilities of the Judeo-Christian God

Reconstruction of Antony’s Argument

Now that the definition of God is set, I can proceed to evaluate Antony’s argument about the existence of such a God. Antony’s argument can be summarized in the following premise-conclusion form:

P1: No morally good being would fail to prevent suffering if he or she were able to prevent it, unless he or she had a good reason to permit it.

P2: An omnipotent being would always be able to prevent suffering.

P3: Probably, there is no good reason that a morally good, omnipotent being could have for failing to prevent suffering.

P4: Therefore, if there were a morally good, omnipotent being, then probably there would be no suffering.

P5: There is suffering.

C: Therefore, probably there is no being who is both morally good and omnipotent.

P4 synthesizes P1–3 by concluding that if there were a morally good, omnipotent being, then there would probably be no suffering. Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine a situation where a parent has a child who is suffering from a terminal illness and experiencing intense pain. Now, if the parent has the means to easily obtain pain-relieving treatment for the child but chooses not to do so, most people would regard this as morally abhorrent. This scenario is often used to illustrate the moral intuition behind the idea that a morally perfect and all-powerful being would not simply sit idly by while innocent beings suffer needlessly without intervening for good reason. In other words, it raises questions about the moral responsibilities of individuals in positions of greater power or ability to alleviate suffering.

Antony points to real examples of intense suffering, such as terminal illness and natural disasters, to illustrate the undeniable P5.

Given P1–4, which suggests a morally good, omnipotent being would prevent unjustified suffering, and P5, which affirms there is unjustified suffering, it logically follows that there probably is no being that is both morally good and omnipotent. This is because it is impossible for a morally good and omnipotent being to permit unjustified suffering. Therefore, if unjustified suffering exists, it is impossible for the conclusion to be false — there cannot be a morally good and omnipotent being.

While Antony’s argument is logically valid, I have some concerns about its soundness, specifically regarding P3. Antony briefly considers potential counterarguments, such as free will and unknown cosmic purposes, but dismisses them as unable to account for natural suffering not caused by human action. For example, she believes animals suffering from natural events demonstrates the presence of unnecessary evil since animals lack free will and seemingly would serve no grander purpose. P3 makes a strong claim about the probability of there being no good reasons for God to permit suffering, without adequately supporting the assumption that humans can determine this. While Antony provides a reasonable evidential argument, P3 raises some concerns about soundness by relying on an unsupported assumption about the scope of human moral knowledge.

Embracing the Mystery of Divine Purposes

Antony raises challenging concerns about whether God’s purposes could outweigh the suffering in our world. However, there is a tension between her Judeo-Christian conception of God and a key premise in her argument. My argument is that as a finite being, Antony cannot use P3 — “probably, there is no good reason that a morally good, omnipotent being could have for failing to prevent suffering” — because it is logically impossible for such a being, by definition, to not have good reasons for permitting suffering, as He is not malevolent but Love itself.

This is what I am going to argue in premise-conclusion form:

P1: God is an omnibenevolent, morally perfect being.

P2: Human moral knowledge is limited and imperfect compared to an omniscient God’s knowledge.

P2: An omniscient God could have morally sufficient reasons beyond human comprehension for allowing suffering.

C: Therefore, it is probable that God has good moral reasons for permitting suffering that are beyond flawed human understanding.

Antony’s use of the word “probably” in P3 implies that the apparent lack of good reasons for God to permit suffering is more likely than the existence of such reasons. However, given the limits of human moral knowledge compared to an omniscient God, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude good reasons probably do not exist. Rather, our finite knowledge should lead us to acknowledge the probability that morally sufficient reasons could exist beyond our comprehension. Therefore, Antony is unjustified in asserting it is probably the case that no good reasons exist. Given our finite moral knowledge, a more accurate assessment is that it is more likely that God has morally sufficient reasons that humans simply cannot grasp.

Consequently, I conclude that Antony’s specific wording of P3 as “probably” rather than definitively makes her argument likely or probably unsound rather than demonstrably unsound. This highlights the need for caution when claiming probabilities regarding an omniscient God’s potential morally sufficient reasons.

Given his unlimited wisdom and capabilities, it is possible to consider that there may be reasons beyond our understanding for God’s actions. The eternal fate of our souls is more significant to God than our earthly comfort. Suffering may serve a purpose in spiritual growth that we cannot comprehend. Additionally, facing adversity can cultivate courage and compassion, which are among the most valuable traits for humans but may require experiencing suffering to develop. As stated in Isaiah 55:8–9: “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways.” Antony overestimates our epistemic ability to evaluate divine motives and God’s intricate providential plan.

In response, one could argue on behalf of Antony that even if we cannot know whether or not God has a good reason to allow suffering, we can recognize what constitutes a good reason — and there probably is no such reason:

P1: Allowing X to suffer can be permissible only if X suffering is necessary for X to achieve a sufficiently important and morally laudable goal.

P2: In the case of all the suffering we observe in the world, either there is no sufficiently important and morally laudable goal that can justify it or such suffering is not necessary.

C: Thus, in the case of all the suffering we observe in the world, allowing such suffering cannot be permissible.

However, this counterargument falls victim to the same flawed assumptions about the scope of human moral knowledge. As imperfect, limited beings, we cannot presume to fully understand what constitutes a “good reason” for an omniscient, morally perfect God. Our finite minds cannot comprehend all the possible, sufficient reasons an all-knowing deity could have for allowing suffering. Thus, the counterargument unjustifiably assumes human knowledge is enough to judge whether any potential divine justification fits human concepts of a “good reason.” Given God’s superior omniscience and morality, God likely has good reasons for allowing suffering that goes beyond human reasoning.

In this section, I argued that P3 relies on an unsupported assumption about the scope of human moral knowledge. Specifically, I contended that premise P3 makes an unjustified claim about the probability that an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God could have no good reasons for permitting suffering.

Conclusion

Though Antony raises important challenges to the existence of the Christian God, her argument depends on an unwarranted assumption that our finite human minds can discern whether divine purposes justify God’s permission of suffering. It is reasonable to think that it is more probable that morally sufficient reasons we cannot comprehend do exist rather than do not exist.

Bibliography

Antony, Louise M. No Good Reason-Exploring the Problem of Evil (p. 36–45)