Can Genuine Moral Laws Exist Without God?
Among the most important questions in metaethics is whether genuine moral laws can exist without God. Carefully defining the key concepts at play here is essential. Moral laws are authoritative principles or rules that tell us what we are genuinely and objectively obligated to do or refrain from doing morally. In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” G. E. M. Anscombe argues that the concept of moral laws requires something or someone to legislate and enforce them. The divine command theory states that an action is morally obligatory if and only if God wills it. According to Anscombe’s view, God would simply be the legislator and enforcer of all morality.
The implications of this question are quite immense. If divine command theory is correct, and God does not exist, then it would appear to follow that there can be no genuine universally applicable moral laws whatsoever. All that could possibly remain are individual moral opinions, preferences, and social imperatives utterly lacking in objective force. In this paper, I will first elaborate on the compelling arguments marshaled by Anscombe for the position that moral laws and obligations logically require grounding in divine command theory. Then, I will develop a persuasive objection to her reasoning. However, I will go on to provide a rebuttal to this objection, ultimately arguing that Anscombe is correct.
Analyzing Anscombe’s Argument
Anscombe argues that without God as a supreme lawgiver, moral obligations and duties cannot exist. Her core reasoning is that the very concept of a “law” or “rule” logically requires an authority that imposes and enforces it. In the moral realm, she contends, only God can serve as this authoritative source of binding ethical requirements. Addressing the concept of having a rule and what enforces it, Anscombe responds to alternative theories such as self-imposed moral obligations, emotions, social obligations, and pleasure and pain. She refutes the idea of self-imposed obligations by highlighting that individuals can choose to abandon them, undermining their inherent moral authority. Anscombe challenges the reliability of emotions like conscience and guilt as sources of moral obligations, noting that conscience can lead individuals to commit immoral acts. She also critiques social obligations enforced by customs and societal norms, arguing that they are no better than sentiment and can dictate individuals to engage in immoral behavior. Additionally, Anscombe dismisses the notion that pleasure and pain alone can serve as the foundation for moral obligations, as these internal sensations lack the capacity to impose and enforce obligations as actions do.
Ultimately, Anscombe asserts that the law-giver and law-enforcer of our moral obligations is God, advocating for divine command theory as the necessary foundation for moral laws and obligations. By grounding moral principles in a transcendent source, Anscombe underscores the importance of maintaining the objectivity and authority required for a coherent ethical framework. While Anscombe allows for morality in some sense, her position maintains that in the absence of God as the ultimate legislator and enforcer, one cannot have authoritative, binding moral rules and obligations that transcend mere individual opinion or social convention. Secular ethical frameworks would thus be limited to non-legalistic moral perspectives that do not depend on the notion of objective, universal moral laws.
Now that I have elaborated Anscombe’s position and her main arguments for divine command theory as the necessary grounding for objective moral laws, I will develop a compelling objection to her reasoning.
The Euthyphro Dilemma
A powerful objection to Anscombe’s theory arises from the Euthyphro dilemma, a famous philosophical challenge posed in Plato’s dialogue. This dilemma questions whether moral rightness and obligations are grounded in the commands of God, or if God’s commands simply reflect an independent, objective moral standard.
The crux of the dilemma is this: Is something morally right because God commands it to be so? Or does God command things precisely because they are moral and right according to a separate ethical reality? These two possibilities pose equal difficulties for divine command theory as the foundation for genuine moral laws.
If we take the first viewpoint — that things are moral simply because God wills them — this seems to render morality utterly arbitrary. On this view, moral laws and duties have no deeper justification beyond the divine fiat. Torturing innocents for amusement or systemic oppression could be morally permissible if God merely commanded it. This undermines the objective, reasoned basis we typically ascribe to ethics.
Yet the second possibility is no less problematic. If God issues commands based on an independent, pre-existing standard of moral truth, then this higher moral reality is truly what grounds ethics, not God’s injunctions themselves. God becomes more of a messenger than the ultimate arbiter and source of morality. This severs the necessary connection between morality and the divine that Anscombe insists upon.
Either path seems to unravel the notion of moral laws flowing necessarily from God’s nature and will. If morality is detached from reasons and purely a matter of divine preference, it begins to look capricious and lacking justification. But if God simply relays external moral facts, then those facts, not God, appear to be the real root of moral authority and law.
The Euthyphro dilemma thus poses a profound challenge to Anscombe’s position. It calls into question whether God can coherently serve as the legislator and enforcer upholding objective moral laws in the way she envisions. The dilemma reveals deep tensions in the metaphysical basis for moral obligations on divine command theory.
The False Dilemma
While the Euthyphro dilemma presents a formidable challenge it rests on a false dichotomy and fails to undermine Anscombe’s central thesis. The dilemma forces an unwarranted choice between morality being grounded in either the arbitrary divine will or an external, independent moral reality to which God merely defers. However, there is a third alternative that resolves the dilemma while preserving divine command theory as the basis for genuine moral laws.
This third path holds that it is neither the case that God wills something because it is inherently good, nor that something is good simply because God arbitrarily wills it to be so. Rather, God’s commandments and the resulting moral duties stem necessarily from His own perfect nature as the utmost Good itself. God himself is good. ‘Now as He was going out on the road, one came running, knelt before Him, and asked Him, “Good Teacher, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?” So Jesus said to him, “Why do you call Me good? No one is good but One, that is, God.’ Mark 10:17–18 In this view, moral laws flow from God’s eternal essence rather than existing as brute commands or tracking some external ethical reality.
The key is to recognize that God is not an arbitrary judge or messenger, but is instead the very ground and source of goodness, justice, compassion, and all other moral perfections. It is God’s being that determines and constitutes the moral law, not through willful proclamations, but through the inherent qualities of His existence as the supreme instantiation of The Good. God is “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” — the maximally great being encompassing all pure perfections, including perfect goodness.
So, when God “commands” moral duties like honesty, charity, and prohibitions against cruelty, these are not fickle decrees but necessary expressions of His intrinsically good nature. There is no danger of God sanctioning gratuitous evil or injustice, as such acts would literally contradict His essential identity as consummate moral perfection. The objectivity and inescapability of moral laws arise not from external abstractions, but from the reality that they ultimately emanate from and partake in the supreme goodness that is God’s very being.
From this perspective, moral obligations are objective and justified not due to mere divine voluntarism, but because they reflect and participate in the perfect moral nature that grounds all reality. Divine command theory locates ethical laws in the only domain capable of grounding them — the necessary, unchanging, supremely good essence that is the Christian God. Morality does not float free, but is tethered to and derived from the ultimate wellspring of all goodness, beauty, and justice.
By rooting moral requirements in God’s very identity as Goodness itself, we can avoid the pitfalls of the Euthyphro dilemma while providing a coherent explanation for how moral laws can be both objective and inherently authoritative. Anscombe’s ethical framework remains intact.
Closing Remarks
In this paper, I first elaborated on the compelling arguments marshaled by Anscombe for the position that moral laws and obligations logically require grounding in divine command theory. Subsequently, I developed a persuasive objection to Anscombe’s reasoning, exploring alternative perspectives that challenge the necessity of God as the foundation of moral laws. However, I then provided a rebuttal to these objections, ultimately arguing that Anscombe’s position is correct. Despite the challenges posed by alternative perspectives, Anscombe’s arguments stand firm in advocating for the indispensable role of God in shaping moral obligations and guiding human behavior.
